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Abstract
In this paper, we provide new estimates of skilled workers’ emigration rates
for about 190 countries in 2000 and 170 countries in 1990, including both de-
veloping and industrial countries. Using various statistical sources, we revisit
Carrington and Detragiache’s measures by incorporating information on immi-
grants’ educational attainment and country of origin from almost all OECD
countries. Our database covers 92.7 percent of the OECD immigration stock.
In absolute terms, we show that the largest numbers of highly educated mi-
grants are from Europe, Southern and Eastern Asia and, to a lesser extent,
Central America. Nevertheless, as a proportion of the potential educated la-
bor force, the highest brain drain rates are observed in the Caribbean, Central
America, Western and Eastern Africa. Repeating the exercise for 1990 and
2000 allows us to evaluate the changes in brain drain intensity. Western Africa,
Eastern Africa and Central America experienced a remarkable increase in the
brain drain during the past decade.
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
Until recently, there has been no systematic empirical assessment 
of the economic impact of the brain drain. Despite many case studies and 
anecdotal evidence, the main reason for this seems to be the lack of 
harmonized international data on migration by country of origin and 
education level. An exception is the paper by Carrington and Detragiache 
(1998) which provided skilled migration rates for 61 developing countries 
in 1990. This study relies on a set of tentative assumptions. For example, 
they transpose the skill structure of US immigrants on the OECD total 
immigration stock. 
In this paper, we provide new estimates of skilled workers' 
emigration rates for about 190 countries in 2000 and 170 countries in 
1990, including both developing and industrial countries. Using various 
statistical sources, we revisit Carrington and Detragiache's measures by 
incorporating information on immigrants' educational attainment and 
country of origin from almost all OECD countries. The set of receiving 
countries is restricted to OECD nations. Our database covers 92.7 percent 
of the OECD immigration stock. 
In absolute terms, we show that the largest numbers of highly 
educated migrants are from Europe, Southern and Eastern Asia and, to a 
lesser extent, from Central America. Nevertheless, as a proportion of the 
potential educated labor force, the highest brain drain rates are observed in 
the Caribbean, Central America, and Western and Eastern Africa. 
Repeating the exercise for 1990 and 2000 allows us to evaluate the 
changes in brain drain intensity. Western Africa, Eastern Africa and 
Central America experienced a remarkable increase in the brain drain 
during the past decade. 
Our database delivers information that is rich enough to assess the 
changes in the international distribution of migration rates, to test for the 
(push and pull) determinants per skill group, to evaluate the growth effects 
of migration on source and destination countries or to estimate the 
relationships between migration, trade, foreign R&D and remittances. 
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1 Introduction
In a narrow economic sense, brain drain denotes the international transfers of human
resources. Such transfers have undergone extensive scrutiny in developing countries,
but also in industrial countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom or Germany,
where an important fraction of talented workers are working abroad. There is a fair
amount of evidence suggesting that the brain drain is now much more extensive than
it was 2 or 3 decades ago. For example, Haque and Jahangir (1999) indicate that the
number of highly skilled emigrants from Africa increased from 1,800 a year on aver-
age during the 1960-75 period to 4,400 during 1975-84 and 23,000 during 1984-87.
These trends were con…rmed in the 1990s in the face of the increasingly "quality-
selective” immigration policies introduced in many OECD countries1. Since 1984,
Australia’s immigration policy has o¢cially privileged skilled workers, with the can-
didates being selected according to their prospective ”contribution to the Australian
economy”. Canadian immigration policy follows similar lines, resulting in an increas-
ing share of highly educated people among the selected immigrants; for example, in
1997, 50,000 professional specialists and entrepreneurs immigrated in Canada with
75,000 additional family members, representing 58% of total immigration. In the US,
since the Immigration Act of 1990 - followed by the American Competitiveness and
Work Force Improvement Act of 1998 - emphasis has been put on the selection of
highly skilled workers, through a system of quotas favoring candidates with academic
degrees and/or speci…c professional skills. For the latter category, the annual number
of visas issued for highly skilled professionals (H-1B visas) increased from 110,200
in 1992 to 355,600 in 2000, the totality of this increase being due to immigration
from developing countries. About half of these workers now come from India. In
EU countries, immigration policies are less clear and still oriented toward traditional
targets such as asylum seekers and applicants requesting family reunion. However,
there is some evidence suggesting that European countries are also leaning toward
becoming quality-selective. As reported in Lowell (2002b), "European Commission
President Prodi has called for up to 1.7 million immigrants to …ll a EU-wide labor
shortage through a system similar to the US green cards for quali…ed immigrants”.
A growing number of EU countries (including France, Ireland and the UK) have re-
cently introduced programs aiming at attracting a quali…ed workforce (especially in
the …eld of information, communication and technology - ICT) through the creation
of labor-shortage occupation lists (see Lowell, 2002a). In Germany in February 2000,
Chancelor Schröder announced plans to recruit additional specialists in the …eld of
information technology. The Green cards came into force in August 2001, giving
German ICT-…rms the opportunity to hire up to 20,000 non-EU ICT-specialists for
a maximum of …ve years. More recently, the German Sübmuth-Commission recom-
1According to our calculations, the number of immigrants with tertiary education increased by
about 50,000 a year between 1990 and 2000. Tertiary education refers to more than secondary
education (more than high school).
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mended the introduction of a coherent ‡exible migration policy that allows for both
temporary and permanent labor migrants (see Bauer and Kunze, 2004). In France,
the Ministry of Labor established in 2002 a system to induce highly skilled workers
from outside the EU to live and work in France. Given the apparent demographic
problems and the aging of populations, the intensity of the brain drain could increase
further during the next decades2.
What are the consequences for sending countries? The early literature - which
dates back to the 1960s and 1970s (Grubel and Scott, 1966, Johnson, 1967, Bhag-
wati and Hamada, 1974, Kwok and Leland, 1982) - supports the view that skilled
migration is bad for those left behind. This is the case if the migrants’ contribution
to the economy is greater than his/her marginal product and/or if the education of
skilled emigrants was partly funded by taxes on residents. The negative e¤ects of
the brain drain for source countries have been reformulated in an endogenous growth
framework (Miyagiwa, 1991, Haque and Kim, 1995, Wong and Yip, 1999). More
recently, the e¤ects of migration prospects on human capital formation have been the
focus of several studies (Mountford, 1997, Stark et al., 1998, Vidal, 1998, Beine et
al., 2001), suggesting that such prospects may in fact foster human capital formation
and growth in sending countries. The essence of the argument is that if the return
to education is higher abroad than at home, the possibility of migration increases
the expected return to human capital, thereby enhancing domestic enrollment in ed-
ucation3. More people, therefore, invest in human capital as a result of increased
migration opportunities. This acquisition can contribute positively to growth and
economic performance. Alongside the incentives to acquire education, other chan-
nels through which the brain drain may positively a¤ect the sending economy have
also been proposed. These include a range of ”feedback e¤ects” such as remittances
(Cinar and Docquier, 2004), return migration after additional knowledge (Stark and
Helmenstein, 1997, Domingues Dos Santos and Postel Vinay, 2003) and skills have
been acquired abroad, and the creation of business and trade networks (Dustmann
and Kirchkamp, 2002, Mesnard and Ravallion, 2002)
Understanding and measuring all the mechanisms at work would obviously help
designing adequate policy responses to the brain drain. Until recently, there has
been no systematic empirical assessment of the economic impact of the brain drain.
Despite many case studies and anecdotal evidence, the main reason for this seems
to be the lack of harmonized international data on migration by country of origin
and education level (see Commander et al, 2004). In the absence of such empirical
material, the debate has remained almost exclusively theoretical. In their in‡uential
contribution, Carrington and Detragiache (1998, 1999) provided estimates of the
2See IOM (2003) and World Bank (2003) on the perspectives of brain drain in the twenty-…rst
century.
3According to the IOM (2003), ”prospects of working abroad have increased the expected return
to additional years of education and led many people to invest in more schooling, especially in
occupations in high demand overseas”.
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emigration rates of tertiary educated workers for 61 developing countries. These
estimates are based on three main statistical sources (US Census data on the skill
structure of immigration, OECD data on immigration per country of origin, Barro
and Lee (2000) data describing the skill structure in sending countries). They had to
rely on a set of assumptions. First, for non-US countries, they use OCDE migration
statistics which report limited information on the origin of immigrants4. Second,
they transpose the skill structure of US immigrants on the OECD total immigration
stock. For example, migrants from South Africa to Great Britain are assumed to be
distributed across educational categories in the same way as migrants from South
Africa to the United States. This assumption is particularly tentative for countries
which do not send many migrants to the United States. Adams (2003) used the same
methodology to update the emigration rates of 24 labor-exporting countries in 2000.
Beine et al (2003) used Carrington and Detragiache’s data to predict the growth
impact of the brain drain. Yet, given the assumptions, the evidence concerning the
consequences of skilled migration for developing countries remains not only limited
but also largely inconclusive.
The purpose of this paper is to build an exhaustive international database on
the brain drain describing the loss of skilled workers for all developing and devel-
oped countries. The majority of high-skilled workers go to industrialized countries.
Building on Carrington and Detragiache (1998) and Adams (2003), we focus on the
South-North and North-North brain drain. We are aware that a brain drain can be
observed outside the OECD area (migration of skilled workers to the Gulf countries,
South Africa, Malaysia, Hong-Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, etc) but, at this stage, we
do not take these ‡ows into account5.
We collected data on the immigration structure by educational attainment and
country of birth from all OECD receiving countries. Census and register data are
(or will be) available for about 25 countries in 2000 (out of 30 OECD countries). To
allow comparison between 1990 and 2000, we consider the same number of receiving
countries in 1990 (even if six of them were not members of the OECD). Census data
are (or will be) available for about 18 countries in 1990. Survey data and reasonable
assumptions can be used to evaluate the structure of immigration in the remaining
countries.
In this release of the database, we also use survey data for countries in which the
Census is not yet available in the desired format (i.e. for 12 European countries). At
this stage, we estimate that we are able to characterize the country of birth and the
educational attainment of 92.7 percent of the OECD stock of adult immigrants in
4OCDE statistics su¤er from various limitations (see OCDE, 2002) . For example, they only
provide information on the country of origin for the the main sending countries. In 2000, they are
not avalaible for Greece, Iceland, Mexico, Slovakia, Turkey.
5According to the United Nations (2002), migration to developed countries represented 53 per-
cent of the world migration in 1990 and 60 percent in 2000. High-skill migration is even more
concentrated. In this study, we estimate that about 85 percent of high-skill migrants go to OECD
countries.
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2000 (and 88.8% of the stock in 1990). For the remaining 7.3 percent (11.2 percent in
1990), we usually have information on the country of origin but have to extrapolate
the skill structure on the basis of available information. In the spirit of the Carring-
ton and Detragiache or Adams studies, a method based on the US census requires
extrapolating the skill structure on the basis of 42 percent of the total OECD stock
(36 percent in 1990). Our paper is a strong improvement on earlier e¤orts.
Our method allows to distinguish about 190 sending countries in 2000 and 170
countries in 1990 (before the secession of the Soviet block, ex-Yugoslavia and ex-
Czechoslovakia). Our measures can be used to examine the changes in the interna-
tional distribution of migration rates, to test for the (push and pull) determinants per
skill group, or to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of migration on source
and destination countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
methodology. Emigration rates for 1990 and 2000 are presented in Section 3. Section
4 presents the key indicators of skilled migration. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
This section describes the methodology and the data sources used to compute em-
igration rates of skilled workers for a large set of sending countries. Building on
Carrington and Detragiache, we de…ne the brain drain as the proportion of working
age individuals (aged 25 and over) with at least tertiary educational attainment, born
in a given country but living in another country, taking into account neither their
occupation, nor where education took place, nor when they arrived. To build such
indicators, we proceed in two steps. We …rst compute emigration stocks by educa-
tional attainment from all countries of the world. Then, we evaluate these numbers
as a proportion of the labor force born in the sending country. This gives emigration
rates per educational attainment.
These two steps rely on various assumptions. We distinguish the general as-
sumptions required when all existing data are collected and the speci…c assumptions
inherent to this particular release of the database (some information is estimated on
the basis of survey data). These speci…c assumptions will be progressively relaxed as
new o¢cial statistics become available.
2.1 Step 1 - Emigration stocks
International emigration data are usually not available or of bad quality. Hence, brain
drain can only be captured by aggregating consistent immigration data collected in
receiving countries. Information about the origin and skill of natives and immigrants
is available from national population Censuses. More speci…cally, country i’s Census
usually identi…es individuals on the basis of age, country of birth j, and skill level s.
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Methodology. Our method consists in collecting Census or register data from a
large set of receiving countries, with the highest level of detail on birth countries and
(at least) three levels of educational attainment: s = h for high skilled, s = m for
medium skilled, s = l for low skilled and s = u for unknown. Low skilled workers are
those with primary education (or with 0 to 8 years of schooling in countries where the
highest diploma is not provided); medium skilled workers are those with secondary
education (9 to 12 years of schooling); high skilled workers are those with tertiary
education (13 years and above). The unknowns are either due to the fact that some
immigrants did not declare their educational attainment or to the absence of data
in some receiving countries. Educational categories are built on the basis of country
speci…c information and are compatible with Barro and Lee data on education in
the sending countries. A mapping between the country educational classi…cation
is sometimes required to harmonize the data6. Let M i;jt;s denote the stock of adult
individuals born in j, of skill s, living in country i at time t.
Building an aggregate measure of emigration per educational attainment requires
a rule for sharing the unknown values. Two resonable rules could be considered: either
unknown values can be distributed in the same way as the known values or they can
be assimilated to unskilled. We combine both rules depending on the information
available in the receiving country. For receiving countries where information about
immigrants’ education is available, we assimilate unknowns to unskilled workers. For
example, Australian immigrants who did not mention their educational attainment
are considered as unskilled. In receiving countries where no information about skill
is available, we transpose the skill distribution observed in the rest of the OECD
area. Note that the latter skill distribution is speci…c to each country of birth. For
example, if we have no information about the skill structure of immigrants to Italy,
Algerian emigrants to Italy are assumed to be distributed in the same way as Algerian
emigrants to the rest of the OECD area.
Formally, the stocks of emigrants of skill s from country j at time t (M :jt;s) are
obtained as follows:
M :jt;h =
X
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6For example, Australian data mix information about the highest degree and the number of years
of schooling.
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where ¨it is a (time and country dependent) binary variable equal to one if there is
no data on the immigrants’ skill in country i, and equal to zero otherwise.
Shortcomings. Our methodology is imperfect and could be improved in many
ways. However, we believe that our estimates can be reasonably used to examine the
changes in the international distribution of migration rates, to test for the (push and
pull) determinants of skilled migration. Let us discuss some shortcomings.
A …rst limit of our analysis is that the set of receiving countries is restricted
to OECD nations. Generally speaking, the skill level of immigrants in non-OECD
countries is expected to be very low, except in a few countries such as South Africa
(1.3 million immigrants in 2000), the Gulf countries (9.6 million immigrants in Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Barhain, Oman and Qatar), some Eastern
Asian countries (4 million immigrants in Hong-Kong and Singapore only). According
to their census data, about 17.5 percent of adult immigrants are tertiary educated in
these countries (17 percent in Bahrain, 17.2 percent in Saudi Arabia, 14 percent in
Kuwait, 18.7 in South Africa). Considering that children constitute 25 percent of the
immigration stock, we estimate the number of educated workers at 1.9 million in these
countries. The number of educated people in the rest of the world lies between 1 and
4 million (if the proportion of educated immigrants among adults lies between 2.5 and
10 percent). This implies that focusing on OECD countries, we should capture a large
fraction of the world-wide educated immigration (about 85 percent). Nevertheless,
we are aware that by disregarding non-OECD immigration countries, we probably
underestimate the brain drain for a dozen of developing countries (such as Egypt,
Sudan, Jordan in the neighborhood of the Gulf States, Namibia, Zimbabwe and other
countries which send emigrants to South Africa, etc.).
Another point is that, by focusing on census and register data, our methodology
does not capture illegal immigration for which systematic statistics by education level
and country of origin are not available. Because illegal immigrants are mostly less
educated, we obviously overestimate the average level of education of the immigrant
population. Nevertheless, this limit should not signi…cantly distort our estimates of
the migration rate of highly skilled workers.
Only taking into consideration the population aged 25 and over maximizes the
comparability of the immigration population with the Barro and Lee data on edu-
cational attainment in source countries. It also excludes a large number of students
who emigrated to complete their education. We cannot control for graduate students
aged 25 and over completing their schooling7. Note that, in a limited number of
OECD countries identi…ed below, we are unable to distinguish between young and
adult immigrants.
A related problem is that we have no information on the age of entry. It is
7Carrington and Detragiache (1998) used data from the Institute of International Education to
estimate the number of graduate students completing their schooling in the United States. We
consider that some of these students aged 25 and over receive grants and can be considered as
workers (researchers).
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therefore impossible to distinguish between immigrants who were educated at the time
of their arrival and those who acquired education after they settled in the receiving
country; for example, Mexican-born individuals who arrived in the US at age 5 or
10 and graduated from US high-education institutions are counted as highly-skilled
immigrants. Hence, our de…nition of the brain drain is clearly determined by data
availability. Existing data do not allow us to systematically eliminate foreign-born
individuals arrived with completed schooling or after a given age threshold.
In the US, the proportion of foreign born who arrived before age 15 (i.e. those who
spent part of their schooling time in the US) represents 7.5 percent of the immigration
stock. Since we have no systematic data for the other countries, we cannot control
for children immigration.
Finally, the concept of immigration is not fully homogenous between countries.
When the information exists, we de…ne migration on the basis of the country of birth
rather than citizenship. This concept is recommended by the United Nations8 and bet-
ter captures the decision to emigrate9. Another reason is that the concept of country
of birth is time invariant, contrary to citizenship which changes with naturalization.
The OECD statistics report that 14.4 millions of foreign born were naturalized be-
tween 1991 and 2000. Countries where the number of acquisitions of citizenship is
particularly high are the US (5.6 million), Germany (2.2 million), Canada (1.6 mil-
lion), Australia and France (1.1 million). Data by country of birth are available in a
large majority of OECD countries. However, for some countries, immigrants are only
classi…ed by citizenship (Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan and Korea).
The …rst six columns in table 1 describe the availability of immigration data in
OECD countries as well as the statistical sources. Some of these data are not available
yet. Hence, provisory assumptions are used in this release of the database.
8In the International Migration Report (UN, 2002), the concept of country of birth is used for
159 countries while citizenship is used for 51 countries.
9In some receiving countries such as Germany, immigrants’ children keep their foreign citizenship.
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Table 1. Data sources and assumptions
2000
Data on the stock of 
immigrants
Definition of 
immigrants Main source Age Education Additional - and temporary - assumptions in release 1.0 (see footnote)
Australia Census Count. Birth Australian Bureau of Stat. 25+ Avail. -
Austria Census Count. Birth Central Statistical Office 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Belgium Census Count. Birth National Institute of Stat. 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Canada Census Count. Birth Stat. Canada 25+ Avail. -
Czech Rep Census Count. Birth Czeck statistical office 25+ Avail. -
Denmark Admin. register Count. Birth Stat. Danemark 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Finland Admin. register Count. Birth Statistic Finland 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
France Census Count. Birth Nat. Inst. of Stat. and Econ. studies 25+ Avail. -
Germany Microcensus Citizenship German Mircocensus 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Greece Census Citizenship European Council + Labor Force Survey Estim. Estim. -
Hungary Census Count. Birth Hungarian Central Statistic Office 25+ Avail. -
Iceland Admin. register Count. Birth Stat. Iceland Total Not Avail. -
Ireland Census Count. Birth Central Stat. Office 25+ Avail. Count. birth estimated  on Irish Census. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Italy Census Citizenship National Statistical Institute 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment as the rest of OECD
Japan Admin. register Citizenship  Ministry of Justice Total Not Avail. -
Korea Population register Citizenship National Statistical Office Total Not Avail. -
Luxemburg Census Count. Birth Nat. Inst. of Stat. and Econ. studies 25+ Avail. -
Mexico Census Not Avail. None Total Not Avail. -
Netherlands Census Count. Birth Statistic Netherlands 15+ Estim. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
New Zealand Census Count. Birth Stat. New Zeland 15+ Avail. -
Norway Admin. register Count. Birth Stat. Norway 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment as the rest of OECD
Poland Census Count. Birth Central Statistical Office 13+ Avail. -
Portugal Census Count. Birth National Institute of Stat. 25+ Avail. Educ. attainment as the rest of OECD
Slovak Rep Census Count. Birth Statistical office of the Slovak Rep 25+ Avail. -
Spain Census Count. Birth Instituto national de estadistica 25+ Avail. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Sweden Census Count. Birth Stat. Sweden 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Switzerland Census Count. Birth Swiss Federal Statistical Office 18+ Avail. -
Turkey Census Count. Birth State institute of Stat. 25+ Avail. -
United Kingdom Census Count. Birth National Stat. 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
United States Census 1% sample Count. Birth US Burau of Census (IPUMS) 25+ Avail. IPUMS Sample 1%
Notes (*): EC = European Council data providing the immigration structure by country of citizenchip for European data
LFS = European Labor Force Survey data providing data on country of birth and educational attainment in EU-15 countries
Table 1. Continued
1990
Data on the stock of 
immigrants
Definition of 
immigrants Source Age group Education Additional - and temporary - assumptions in release 1.0 (see footnote)
Australia Census Count. Birth Australian Bureau of Stat. 25+ Avail. -
Austria Census Count. Birth Central Statistical Office 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Belgium Census Count. Birth National Institute of Stat. 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Canada Census Count. Birth Stat. Canada 25+ Avail.  - 
Czech Rep European Council Citizenship European Council Not Avail. Not Avail. -
Denmark Admin. register Count. Birth Stat. Danemark 25+ Estim. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Finland Admin. register Count. Birth Statistic Finland 25+ Avail. Educ. attainment as the rest of OECD
France Census Count. Birth Nat. Inst. of Stat. and Econ. studies 25+ Avail. -
Germany Census Citizenship European Council 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Greece Census Citizenship European Council Estim. Estim. -
Hungary European Council Citizenship European Council Not Avail. Not Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC
Iceland Admin. register Count. Birth Stat. Iceland Total Not Avail. -
Ireland Census Count. Birth Central Stat. Office 25+ Avail. Count. birth estimated  on Irish Census. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Italy Census Citizenship National Statistical Institute Not Avail. Not Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment as the rest of OECD
Japan Admin. register Citizenship Ministry of Justice. Total Not Avail. -
Korea Population register Citizenship National Statistical Office Total Not Avail. -
Luxemburg Census Count. Birth Nat. Inst. of Stat. and Econ. studies 25+ Avail. -
Mexico Census Not Avail. None Total Not Avail. -
Netherlands Census Count. Birth Statistic Netherlands 15+ Estim. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment as the rest of OECD
New Zealand Census Count. Birth Stat. New Zeland 15+ Avail. -
Norway Admin. register Count. Birth Stat. Norway 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment as the rest of OECD
Poland European Council Citizenship European Council Total Not Avail. -
Portugal Census Count. Birth National Institute of Stat. 25+ Avail. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Slovak Rep Included in Czech  -  -  -  -  - 
Spain Census Count. Birth Instituto national de estadistica 25+ Avail. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Sweden Census Count. Birth Stat. Sweden 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
Switzerland Census Count. Birth Swiss Federal Statistical Office 18+ Avail. -
Turkey Census Count. Birth State institute of Stat. 25+ Avail. -
United Kingdom Census 10% sample Count. Birth National Stat. 25+ Avail. Citizenship estimated  on EC. Educ. attainment & share of 25+  on LFS
United States Census 5% sample Count. Birth US Burau of Census (IPUMS) 25+ Avail. IPUMS Sample 5%
Notes (*): EC = European Council data providing the immigration structure by country of citizenchip for European data
LFS = European Labor Force Survey data providing data on country of birth and educational attainment in EU-15 countries
Data available in 2000. Regarding the situation in 2000, we estimate the total
stock of adult immigrants in the OECD area at 58.496 million. The only country for
which data on age, country of birth and educational attainment are missing is Mexico
(0.493 million of immigrants). Data on immigrants’ age and educational attainment
are not available for Japan, Iceland, Korea and Greece (2.030 million immigrants).
However, the combination of European Council data and the European Labor Force
Survey provides a good approximation of the Greek immigration structure (0.116 mil-
lion adult immigrants). In the other 25 countries (55.974 million adult immigrants),
Census and register data are (or will be) available. Adding Censuses and the Greek
survey, we capture 56.090 million immigrants, i.e. 95.9% of the total. Finally, since
about 1.8 million of those immigrants did not report their country of origin, we have
accurate information on educational attainment and origin for 54.246 immigrant, i.e.
92.7% of the OECD adult immigration stock (to be compared with 44.1% in the US
Census).
In the 26 countries (25 Census/Registers and Greece) where data on educational
attainment will be available, we are usually able to work on the population aged
25 and over. However, this age limit is slightly di¤erent in some countries (18 in
Switzerland, 15 in New Zealand, 13 in Poland). This should not distort our measure
of the skilled immigration stock signi…cantly. Contrary to common belief, data on
country of birth are available in a large majority of countries, even in European
countries. The concept of citizenship must only be used for Germany, Italy, as well as
for Greece (European Council data are based on the concept of citizenship), Japan
and Korea.
Data available in 1990. The methodology is similar for 1990. To allow com-
parisons between 1990 and 2000, we consider the same number of receiving countries
in 1990 (even if Hungary, Poland, ex-Czechoslovakia, Korea and Mexico were not
members of the OECD). Our counterfactual 1990 OECD zone includes 29 countries
(Slovakia and the Czech Republic were uni…ed). We estimate the total stock of adult
immigrants in the OECD area at 39.844 million. Mexico is still the only country for
which data on age, country of birth and educational attainment are missing (0.341
million immigrants). Data on immigrants’ age and educational attainment are not
available in ex-Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Japan, Iceland, Korea and
Greece (2.641 million immigrants). However, combining European Council data and
the European Labor Force Survey provides a good approximation for Greece and
Italy (0.646 million adult immigrants). In the other 20 countries (36.862 million
adult immigrants), Census or register data are (or will be) available. Adding Cen-
suses, Italian and Greek surveys, we capture 37.508 million immigrants, i.e. 94.1%
of the total. About 2.1 million of those immigrants did not report their country of
origin. We have accurate information on educational attainment and origin for 35.385
million immigrants, i.e. 88.8% of the OECD adult immigration stock (to be compared
with 38.5% in the US Census).
In the 22 countries (20 Censuses/Registers, Italy and Greece) where data on
12
educational attainment are available, age bounds are identical to those of 2000. The
concept of citizenship must only be used for Germany and for all other countries
where Census and register data are not available.
2.2 Step 2 - Emigration rates
The second step consists in comparing the emigration stocks to the number of re-
maining residents in the source country for the same three educational categories
mentioned above. Calculating the brain drain as a proportion of the total educated
labor force is a better strategy to evaluate the pressure imposed on the local labor
market. It is indeed obvious that the pressure exerted by 1,096 thousand Indian
skilled emigrants (4.5% of the educated total labor force) is less important than the
pressure exerted by 76 thousand Surinamese (90.1% of the educated labor force).
This step requires using data on the skill structure of the adult population in the
countries of origin. Denoting N jt;s as the stock of individuals aged 25+, of skill s in
country j, at time t, we de…ne the emigration rates by
mjt;s =
M ::jt;s
N jt;s +M
::j
t;s
In particular, mjt;h provides some information about the intensity of the brain
drain in the source country j. It measures the fraction of skilled agents born in
country j and living in other OECD countries10.
Data forN jt;s are taken from Barro and Lee (2000). For 1990 and 2000, they provide
the adult population structure by educational attainment for about 120 countries.
Barro and Lee’s educational attainment measures are based on the highest level of
schooling attained. Their measures are based on Census data when available. They
provide perpetual inventory estimates based on historical schooling enrollment …gures
when Censuses are not available.
Combining Census and Survey data on immigration, we obtain the emigration
stock for almost all the countries of the world (191 countries in 2000, 170 in 1990).
For countries where Barro and Lee measures are missing (about 70 countries in 2000),
we use the World Bank data on the population aged 25 and over and transpose
the skill sharing of the bordering country with the closest GDP per capita. Note
that the World Bank database provides the GDP per capita in PPP value for 155
countries. For a limited number of countries, the population aged 25 and over has
been estimated by applying the share of the 25+ observed in the geographical area to
10For some countries, immigrants often travel back and forth between their new and old countries
(e.g. Mexico). They are likely to be counted as still being residents in their home country. For that
reason, Carrington and Detragiache (1998) provide an upper bound (m =M=N) and a lower bound
(m = M=(N +M)). Since the upper bound is not interpretable for a large number of countries
(higher than one), we only report the lower bound.
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the total population size. We believe these two assumptions give good approximations
of the brain drain rate, broadly consistent with anecdotal evidence.
2.3 Speci…c assumptions in release 1.0
Obtaining Census and Register data from all OECD countries is a long process in-
volving numerous exchanges of information. Before data are available in the …nal
desired format, adequate estimates can be provided on the basis of Survey data. This
is especially the case for European countries where the Censuses for 2000 or 2001 are
sometimes not yet available. In these cases, estimates can be obtained by crossing
European Council, Register or Census data on the origin of immigrants, with Labor
Force Survey data on education and age structures.
The last column in Table 1 describes the speci…c assumptions in release 1.0. Labor
Force Survey data are used for 12 EU countries in 2000 and 1990 (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den and the United Kingdom) and immigrants’ educational attainment in Norway
is temporarily extrapolated on the basis of the available OECD countries. In 2000,
while Census data will …nally capture 55.974 million OECD immigrants (95.7% of the
2000 OECD stock), Release 1.0 uses Survey data for characterizing 13.626 million of
them (23.3% of the 2000 stock). In 1990, Release 1.0 uses Survey data for identifying
8.315 million (20.9% of the 1990 OECD stock) out of 36.862 million immigrants for
which Census data will be available (92.5% of the 1990 stock).
Such temporary assumptions11 induce two major shortcomings. First, European
Council data must be used for 10 countries. These data are based on the concept
of citizenship (rather than country of birth). In all cases, information on the birth
country will be available from the national Censuses. Second, the Labor Force Survey
list of country of origin is usually less detailed than the Census list. The survey
distinguishes 22 countries of origin and 10 groups of countries in 1990, 26 countries of
origin and 13 groups of countries in 2000. The most striking example is Africa, which
is divided in three groups (South Africa, Northern Africa and Other Africa). We
compute the skill structure of emigration for these groups of countries and consider it
as homogenous within groups. Despite this limitation, we attempted to a comparison
between Labor Force Survey and Census data for France and obtained very accurate
estimates for most African countries.
Note that we also use the Labor Force Survey to eliminate immigrants aged under
25. For countries where detailed data are not available, the share of young immigrants
is also assumed to be homogenous within groups.
11The …nal database for 1990 and 2000 should be available by December 2004.
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3 The database
Table 2 provides the emigration rates by educational category in 1990 and 2000.
Countries are classi…ed by geographical area. We distinguish 4 American areas (North
America, the Caribbean, Central America and South America), 4 European areas
(Northern Europe, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Southern Europe), 5 African
areas (Northern Africa, Central Africa, Western Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern
Africa), 4 Asian areas (Western Asia, South-Central Asia, South-Eastern Asia and
Eastern Asia) and 1 Oceanian area. Between 1990 and 2000, the world con…guration
changed. Czechoslovakia seceded into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Repub-
lic, the ex-USSR seceded into 15 countries (7 on the European continent and 8 on
the Asian continent), Ex-Yugoslavia seceded into 5 countries, Eritrea emerged as a
new country in 1993. To make comparisons possible, we compute information for
ex-Yugoslavia, for the ex-USSR and ex-Czechoslovakia in 2000. The column ”relia-
bility rate” provides, for each sending country, the proportion of emigrants for which
accurate information about education attainment has been collected (from the total
number of individuals declared as emigrants from that country). In a large majority
of cases, the reliability rate is higher than 90 percent. Changes between 1990 and 2000
are given in the last two columns, but only for countries showing a high reliability
rate in 1990 and 2000 (the minimal threshold is set at 70 percent).
15
Table 2 - Emigration rates by educational attaiment and country of birth (1990-2000) (1/6)
Situation in 1990 Situation in 2000  Brain drain change 2000/1990
Reliability 
rate
Migration 
rate - 
Primary 
education
Migration 
rate - 
Secondary 
education
Migration 
rate - 
Tertiary 
education
Migration 
rate - all 
education 
groups
Reliability 
rate
Migration 
rate - 
Primary 
education
Migration 
rate - 
Secondary 
education
Migration 
rate - 
Tertiary 
education
Migration 
rate - all 
education 
groups
Variation in 
percentage points 
(*)
Ratio (rate in 
2000 / rate in 
1990) (*)
AMERICA
Northern America 1.4% 0.6% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.6% 1.0% 0.8% 0.17% 1.21
Canada 98.0% 3.7% 5.1% 4.8% 4.7% 98.2% 1.7% 5.0% 4.9% 4.3% 0.2% 1.03
United States 85.2% 1.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 86.8% 0.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.1% 1.28
Central America 5.6% 10.4% 12.9% 7.3% 8.1% 15.6% 16.1% 11.0% 3.11% 1.24
Belize 99.9% 5.0% 48.6% 62.6% 22.8% 99.9% 3.6% 49.2% 51.0% 18.4% -11.6% 0.81
Costa Rica 99.0% 0.6% 7.5% 7.7% 2.6% 99.3% 0.8% 9.4% 6.6% 3.0% -1.1% 0.86
El Salvador 99.3% 8.2% 38.5% 32.9% 14.4% 99.4% 11.2% 53.6% 31.5% 20.2% -1.4% 0.96
Guatemala 99.7% 2.1% 18.9% 18.2% 4.3% 99.9% 3.5% 22.8% 21.5% 6.9% 3.2% 1.18
Honduras 99.6% 1.6% 13.2% 21.1% 4.0% 99.8% 3.2% 21.3% 21.8% 6.9% 0.7% 1.03
Mexico 99.9% 6.5% 8.9% 10.4% 7.4% 99.9% 9.5% 14.3% 14.3% 11.5% 3.9% 1.38
Nicaragua 99.7% 2.3% 23.9% 29.0% 7.7% 99.8% 2.5% 19.1% 30.9% 8.9% 1.9% 1.07
Panama 99.6% 1.1% 9.6% 21.7% 7.7% 99.7% 0.9% 8.7% 20.0% 7.5% -1.8% 0.92
The Caribbean 4.8% 17.6% 41.4% 11.6% 5.1% 17.8% 40.9% 13.9% -0.53% 0.99
Antigua and Barbuda 99.8% 7.0% 31.7% 65.3% 27.6% 99.9% 6.0% 35.9% 70.9% 36.7% 5.6% 1.09
Bahamas, The 99.7% 3.7% 11.7% 38.3% 11.0% 99.8% 1.5% 12.1% 36.4% 12.2% -1.9% 0.95
Barbados 99.8% 14.1% 24.8% 63.5% 26.4% 100.0% 9.9% 24.3% 61.4% 27.8% -2.1% 0.97
Cuba 99.7% 5.4% 11.9% 31.0% 10.5% 99.1% 5.5% 9.4% 28.9% 10.5% -2.1% 0.93
Dominica 97.7% 16.6% 62.1% 58.9% 32.0% 96.9% 8.0% 60.6% 58.9% 32.1% 0.0% 1.00
Dominican Republic 97.5% 3.8% 23.6% 17.9% 7.9% 98.1% 5.8% 30.9% 21.7% 12.5% 3.8% 1.21
Grenada 99.8% 7.5% 61.1% 68.8% 30.5% 100.0% 9.9% 69.5% 66.7% 40.1% -2.0% 0.97
Haiti 99.9% 2.1% 23.7% 78.3% 7.3% 99.9% 2.5% 27.5% 81.6% 10.2% 3.3% 1.04
Jamaica 99.8% 11.0% 28.9% 84.1% 25.6% 100.0% 8.3% 30.0% 82.5% 29.0% -1.7% 0.98
Saint Kitts and Nevis 99.7% 10.8% 21.4% 89.9% 28.9% 100.0% 10.3% 37.1% 71.8% 38.5% -18.0% 0.80
Saint Lucia 99.7% 1.9% 46.8% 80.4% 11.6% 99.9% 2.6% 32.1% 36.0% 14.0% -44.4% 0.45
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 99.8% 5.9% 56.7% 89.8% 22.4% 99.9% 6.3% 53.4% 56.8% 28.0% -33.0% 0.63
Trinidad and Tobago 99.7% 5.7% 19.3% 77.2% 18.9% 100.0% 6.1% 20.6% 78.4% 23.7% 1.2% 1.02
South America 0.2% 2.5% 4.7% 1.0% 0.4% 3.0% 5.7% 1.5% 1.03% 1.22
Argentina 94.8% 0.3% 1.1% 3.3% 0.9% 94.3% 0.3% 1.1% 2.5% 0.9% -0.8% 0.75
Bolivia 95.4% 0.1% 1.9% 5.9% 1.0% 98.1% 0.3% 4.6% 6.0% 1.8% 0.1% 1.01
Brazil 62.5% 0.1% 0.9% 1.7% 0.3% 47.2% 0.1% 1.5% 3.3% 0.6% non reliab. non reliab.
Chile 82.5% 0.6% 1.9% 6.3% 1.7% 97.9% 0.8% 1.8% 5.3% 1.9% -1.0% 0.85
Colombia 97.0% 0.5% 3.9% 9.2% 1.8% 98.2% 0.8% 4.6% 11.0% 2.7% 1.8% 1.19
Ecuador 98.0% 0.8% 8.7% 5.4% 2.7% 97.0% 2.4% 10.6% 10.9% 5.6% 5.5% 2.02
Guyana 98.8% 10.9% 30.6% 89.2% 28.0% 100.0% 13.7% 34.1% 85.9% 34.5% -3.3% 0.96
Paraguay 96.8% 0.2% 0.8% 3.2% 0.6% 96.2% 0.2% 0.7% 2.3% 0.5% -0.8% 0.74
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Peru 85.3% 0.3% 2.6% 5.6% 1.6% 77.8% 0.7% 3.6% 6.3% 2.8% 0.7% 1.12
Suriname 100.0% 15.7% 54.0% 92.0% 42.1% 100.0% 17.5% 43.9% 89.9% 43.3% -2.1% 0.98
Uruguay 96.3% 0.9% 2.5% 6.1% 1.9% 97.6% 1.1% 2.7% 8.6% 2.6% 2.5% 1.41
Venezuela 96.9% 0.2% 1.8% 3.9% 0.8% 96.7% 0.1% 2.4% 3.3% 0.9% -0.6% 0.86
EUROPE
Northern Europe 6.3% 3.8% 16.2% 6.9% 5.4% 4.4% 14.3% 6.8% -1.88% 0.88
Denmark 66.8% 3.9% 2.1% 8.2% 3.9% 96.9% 5.2% 2.6% 7.0% 4.4% non reliab. non reliab.
Estonia  -  -  -  -  - 99.5% 3.4% 4.4% 13.9% 5.4%  -  - 
Finland 42.2% 4.3% 2.4% 10.3% 4.4% 99.1% 8.8% 5.9% 8.4% 7.3% non reliab. non reliab.
Iceland 64.0% 4.2% 8.1% 28.8% 9.0% 99.2% 9.3% 7.7% 16.3% 9.8% non reliab. non reliab.
Ireland 99.2% 35.1% 18.2% 34.4% 28.5% 99.5% 18.2% 20.2% 34.4% 22.8% 0.0% 1.00
Latvia  -  -  -  -  - 99.0% 1.7% 2.0% 10.2% 3.0%  -  - 
Lithuania  -  -  -  -  - 99.7% 7.3% 2.8% 11.8% 5.4%  -  - 
Norway 74.6% 7.8% 1.8% 8.2% 3.8% 98.1% 9.0% 2.2% 5.4% 3.9% -2.8% 0.66
Sweden 77.9% 1.7% 1.6% 5.0% 2.3% 96.4% 4.9% 1.3% 4.4% 2.8% -0.6% 0.87
United Kingdom 96.7% 5.3% 3.7% 18.9% 6.9% 98.6% 4.5% 4.3% 16.7% 7.0% -2.2% 0.88
Western Europe 2.3% 2.4% 10.4% 3.4% 2.2% 2.3% 7.3% 3.2% -3.15% 0.70
Austria 94.5% 5.7% 4.4% 18.3% 6.2% 97.2% 6.0% 4.1% 11.1% 5.8% -7.2% 0.60
Belgium 81.6% 2.0% 2.1% 7.0% 2.7% 97.1% 1.7% 2.9% 5.9% 2.9% -1.1% 0.84
France 88.8% 1.1% 1.6% 5.1% 1.7% 95.2% 1.2% 1.6% 3.9% 1.9% -1.2% 0.76
Germany 84.1% 2.6% 2.7% 14.3% 4.0% 97.7% 2.4% 2.4% 8.8% 3.6% -5.5% 0.62
Liechtenstein 88.9% 8.3% 20.0% 27.7% 17.2% 99.0% 6.1% 15.9% 16.9% 13.3% -10.8% 0.61
Luxembourg 93.2% 4.9% 5.8% 11.1% 6.1% 98.0% 4.1% 6.1% 7.6% 5.4% -3.5% 0.69
Monaco 98.3% 5.2% 2.5% 13.2% 5.2% 98.5% 4.5% 6.5% 15.3% 7.4% 2.1% 1.16
Netherlands 97.2% 5.1% 2.6% 11.3% 5.1% 99.8% 5.0% 2.9% 8.9% 4.9% -2.4% 0.79
Switzerland 85.3% 2.8% 1.7% 10.4% 3.3% 92.4% 2.0% 1.8% 9.1% 3.1% -1.3% 0.88
Southern Europe 5.8% 6.4% 11.2% 6.4% 5.5% 6.0% 9.0% 6.2% -2.19% 0.80
Albania 84.2% 0.5% 0.4% 1.6% 0.5% 23.2% 4.5% 9.0% 20.0% 8.1% non reliab. non reliab.
Andorra  -  -  -  -  - 97.8% 1.0% 1.0% 2.3% 1.2%  -  - 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  -  -  -  -  - 97.3% 11.7% 17.0% 28.6% 15.9%  -  - 
Croatia  -  -  -  -  - 95.2% 9.7% 10.3% 29.4% 12.4%  -  - 
Greece 96.3% 8.2% 8.8% 18.9% 9.4% 98.1% 8.5% 7.8% 14.0% 9.1% -4.9% 0.74
Italy 98.8% 5.2% 5.7% 9.9% 5.8% 99.9% 4.5% 4.9% 7.0% 5.0% -2.8% 0.72
Macedonia  -  -  -  -  - 88.1% 12.7% 11.5% 20.9% 13.1%  -  - 
Malta 99.1% 26.9% 14.4% 71.5% 27.7% 98.8% 25.6% 10.1% 55.2% 23.9% -16.3% 0.77
Portugal 98.8% 13.1% 17.6% 14.6% 13.9% 99.5% 13.1% 20.5% 13.8% 14.3% -0.8% 0.94
San Marino 14.9% 14.9% 18.1% 29.8% 17.5% 11.7% 9.1% 1.4% 29.9% 10.8% non reliab. non reliab.
Serbia and Montenegro  -  -  -  -  - 87.3% 6.1% 7.4% 17.4% 7.9%  -  - 
Slovenia  -  -  -  -  - 96.5% 4.9% 4.1% 11.0% 5.5%  -  - 
Spain 95.2% 1.8% 2.7% 3.4% 2.2% 96.9% 1.6% 1.8% 2.6% 1.8% -0.8% 0.76
Ex-Yugoslavia 90.5% 13.5% 13.1% 32.3% 14.9% (8.3%) (9.8%) (21.5%) (10.5%)  -  - 
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Eastern Europe 1.4% 0.4% 2.3% 0.9% 2.3% 1.4% 4.5% 2.2% 2.16% 1.94
Belarus  -  -  -  -  - 99.2% 3.1% 1.2% 3.0% 2.2%  -  - 
Bulgaria 96.4% 7.0% 3.1% 2.7% 5.0% 98.2% 8.6% 6.0% 5.8% 7.1% 3.1% 2.13
Czech Republic  -  -  -  -  - 97.7% 4.2% 1.9% 9.9% 3.6%  -  - 
Hungary 88.7% 1.7% 3.9% 13.5% 3.7% 98.9% 2.4% 3.7% 12.1% 4.1% -1.3% 0.90
Moldova  -  -  -  -  - 91.9% 0.8% 0.7% 4.2% 1.1%  -  - 
Poland 92.8% 3.1% 2.5% 12.8% 3.7% 96.8% 3.0% 3.1% 12.3% 4.1% -0.5% 0.96
Romania 51.1% 1.9% 1.0% 11.1% 2.0% 66.1% 3.6% 1.7% 14.1% 3.5% non reliab. non reliab.
Russian Federation  -  -  -  -  - 95.6% 0.4% 0.3% 1.3% 0.6%  -  - 
Slovakia  -  -  -  -  - 90.5% 10.0% 9.3% 15.3% 10.3%  -  - 
Ukraine  -  -  -  -  - 96.5% 2.9% 1.0% 6.0% 2.2%  -  - 
Ex-Czechoslovakia 77.2% 1.9% 1.3% 10.9% 2.4% (6.4%) (4.3%) (11.9%) (6.0%)  -  - 
Ex-USSR 31.1% 0.6% 0.1% 0.8% 0.3% (1.1%) (0.5%) (2.4%) (1.0%)  -  - 
AFRICA
Northern Africa 2.2% 1.8% 6.8% 2.4% 2.3% 1.5% 6.2% 2.5% -0.62% 0.91
Algeria 98.4% 4.5% 1.8% 6.7% 4.4% 97.1% 3.6% 1.3% 6.5% 3.3% -0.2% 0.98
Egypt 86.4% 0.2% 1.0% 5.3% 0.7% 84.0% 0.2% 0.7% 4.2% 0.8% -1.1% 0.80
Libya 88.5% 0.3% 1.7% 13.9% 0.9% 90.6% 0.4% 0.8% 3.8% 0.9% -10.1% 0.27
Morocco 90.8% 6.1% 3.7% 9.3% 6.0% 80.5% 7.8% 3.8% 10.3% 7.1% 1.0% 1.11
Sudan 86.4% 0.0% 0.4% 5.0% 0.1% 97.5% 0.1% 0.7% 5.6% 0.2% 0.6% 1.13
Tunisia 86.6% 4.6% 3.4% 12.3% 4.7% 71.1% 4.2% 3.0% 9.6% 4.3% -2.7% 0.78
Central Africa 0.5% 1.0% 9.8% 0.6% 0.4% 1.3% 13.3% 0.8% 3.54% 1.36
Angola 97.7% 2.8% 1.3% 7.1% 2.7% 98.9% 2.1% 3.4% 25.6% 2.7% 18.4% 3.59
Cameroon 93.6% 0.2% 1.1% 15.2% 0.4% 92.2% 0.2% 1.4% 14.6% 0.7% -0.5% 0.97
Central African Republic 96.8% 0.1% 0.5% 4.4% 0.2% 94.7% 0.1% 0.5% 4.7% 0.2% 0.3% 1.06
Chad 94.6% 0.0% 1.0% 8.7% 0.1% 94.7% 0.0% 0.8% 6.9% 0.1% -1.8% 0.80
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 89.3% 0.1% 1.1% 8.3% 0.3% 94.7% 0.1% 0.5% 7.9% 0.3% -0.4% 0.95
Congo, Rep. of the 92.3% 0.6% 0.6% 11.7% 1.1% 94.9% 1.4% 2.1% 19.1% 2.6% 7.4% 1.64
Equatorial Guinea 82.1% 0.1% 0.7% 4.3% 0.2% 98.8% 2.9% 6.4% 34.1% 4.1% 29.7% 7.84
Gabon 94.0% 0.2% 1.3% 21.2% 0.5% 94.1% 0.3% 1.1% 19.3% 0.8% -1.9% 0.91
Sao Tome and Principe 96.8% 6.6% 0.7% 9.7% 6.2% 98.6% 4.0% 9.6% 35.6% 5.6% 25.9% 3.67
Western Africa 0.3% 1.1% 20.7% 0.5% 0.3% 2.8% 26.7% 0.8% 6.04% 1.29
Benin 91.5% 0.1% 0.4% 6.1% 0.2% 85.5% 0.1% 0.5% 7.5% 0.3% 1.4% 1.23
Burkina Faso 70.0% 0.1% 0.1% 2.6% 0.1% 50.4% 0.1% 0.4% 3.3% 0.2% non reliab. non reliab.
Cape Verde 75.2% 20.1% 55.9% 54.4% 23.8% 90.3% 14.7% 60.9% 69.1% 23.5% 14.6% 1.27
Cote d'Ivoire 82.8% 0.2% 1.2% 6.1% 0.3% 75.1% 0.3% 1.8% 7.8% 0.6% 1.7% 1.28
Gambia, The 81.4% 1.0% 0.9% 76.0% 1.3% 97.1% 1.7% 7.8% 64.7% 3.1% -11.3% 0.85
Ghana 76.4% 0.8% 0.9% 33.7% 1.2% 81.3% 0.7% 2.2% 42.9% 1.9% 9.2% 1.27
Guinea 92.2% 0.2% 0.2% 5.1% 0.3% 92.6% 0.3% 0.4% 11.1% 0.5% 6.0% 2.18
Guinea-Bissau 94.3% 0.8% 0.6% 5.9% 0.8% 97.3% 1.3% 9.3% 29.4% 1.8% 23.5% 4.95
Liberia 90.1% 0.1% 2.2% 27.7% 1.1% 99.3% 0.4% 7.4% 37.4% 2.6% 9.7% 1.35
Table 2 - Emigration rates by educational attaiment and country of birth (1990-2000) (4/6)
Mali 99.2% 0.7% 0.6% 6.6% 0.7% 98.6% 0.6% 1.7% 11.5% 0.7% 4.9% 1.74
Mauritania 91.9% 0.6% 0.2% 3.5% 0.6% 93.9% 1.0% 3.9% 23.1% 1.4% 19.6% 6.56
Niger 83.5% 0.0% 0.6% 8.3% 0.1% 73.8% 0.0% 0.5% 6.1% 0.1% -2.2% 0.74
Nigeria 89.6% 0.0% 1.6% 34.3% 0.2% 88.8% 0.1% 3.7% 36.1% 0.4% 1.8% 1.05
Senegal 72.1% 1.4% 2.2% 11.1% 1.6% 56.5% 1.7% 5.9% 24.1% 2.6% non reliab. non reliab.
Sierra Leone 94.1% 0.1% 1.9% 31.0% 0.5% 97.5% 0.3% 5.3% 41.0% 1.4% 10.0% 1.32
Togo 90.3% 0.3% 0.6% 8.9% 0.5% 94.2% 0.5% 2.3% 13.6% 1.0% 4.7% 1.53
Eastern Africa 0.2% 1.0% 15.5% 0.4% 0.2% 1.6% 18.4% 0.6% 2.97% 1.19
Burundi 85.0% 0.0% 1.0% 5.0% 0.1% 91.0% 0.1% 2.0% 19.9% 0.3% 14.9% 3.95
Comoros 98.6% 0.8% 1.4% 6.4% 1.0% 100.0% 1.9% 2.6% 14.5% 2.2% 8.0% 2.25
Djibouti 87.6% 0.2% 0.9% 9.4% 0.3% 97.6% 0.2% 1.3% 17.8% 0.5% 8.4% 1.90
Eritrea  -  -  -  -  - 87.7% 0.6% 12.8% 45.8% 2.3%  -  - 
Ethiopia 80.1% 0.2% 1.1% 13.9% 0.4% 93.2% 0.1% 2.8% 17.0% 0.5% 3.2% 1.23
Kenya 96.6% 0.1% 0.8% 26.9% 0.5% 98.8% 0.1% 0.9% 26.3% 0.7% -0.7% 0.98
Madagascar 96.2% 0.1% 3.1% 55.2% 0.2% 93.8% 0.1% 1.8% 36.0% 0.2% -19.1% 0.65
Malawi 95.7% 0.0% 0.3% 7.5% 0.1% 99.3% 0.0% 0.8% 9.4% 0.1% 1.9% 1.25
Mauritius 91.2% 3.8% 4.3% 37.2% 5.3% 81.8% 5.3% 5.0% 48.0% 7.2% 10.8% 1.29
Mozambique 99.3% 0.8% 1.1% 18.2% 0.8% 99.6% 0.5% 5.8% 42.0% 0.9% 23.8% 2.31
Rwanda 87.7% 0.0% 1.7% 9.4% 0.1% 93.1% 0.0% 2.1% 19.0% 0.2% 9.6% 2.02
Seychelles 92.5% 11.4% 10.8% 48.9% 14.2% 100.0% 9.7% 10.0% 58.6% 14.6% 9.7% 1.20
Somalia 92.5% 11.4% 10.8% 48.9% 14.2% 100.0% 9.7% 10.0% 58.6% 14.6% 9.7% 1.20
Tanzania 96.8% 0.1% 0.8% 14.8% 0.3% 98.4% 0.1% 1.0% 15.8% 0.3% 1.0% 1.07
Uganda 95.6% 0.1% 0.4% 29.9% 0.4% 98.9% 0.1% 1.2% 21.6% 0.5% -8.3% 0.72
Zambia 92.5% 0.0% 0.3% 12.2% 0.2% 98.5% 0.1% 0.3% 10.0% 0.3% -2.2% 0.82
Zimbabwe 97.3% 0.1% 0.4% 5.1% 0.5% 99.7% 0.2% 0.7% 7.6% 0.8% 2.5% 1.50
Southern Africa 0.1% 0.5% 6.9% 0.5% 0.3% 0.5% 5.3% 0.9% -1.57% 0.77
Botswana 86.2% 0.0% 0.1% 1.7% 0.1% 98.2% 0.1% 0.8% 2.1% 0.3% 0.3% 1.20
Lesotho 92.5% 0.0% 0.1% 6.2% 0.1% 98.0% 0.0% 0.1% 2.4% 0.0% -3.9% 0.38
Namibia 87.9% 0.0% 0.1% 2.9% 0.2% 99.1% 0.1% 0.2% 3.4% 0.3% 0.5% 1.18
South Africa 96.2% 0.2% 0.5% 7.2% 0.5% 99.7% 0.4% 0.5% 5.4% 1.0% -1.8% 0.75
Swaziland 60.0% 0.1% 0.3% 3.6% 0.3% 99.6% 0.2% 0.2% 5.8% 0.5% non reliab. non reliab.
ASIA
Western Asia 2.6% 4.7% 6.9% 3.3% 2.8% 2.9% 5.8% 3.2% -1.10% 0.84
Armenia  -  -  -  -  - 99.4% 1.3% 1.8% 11.2% 2.9%  -  - 
Azerbaijan  -  -  -  -  - 99.5% 0.5% 0.2% 2.6% 0.6%  -  - 
Bahrain 95.8% 0.1% 0.4% 3.3% 0.5% 100.0% 0.1% 0.6% 3.4% 0.7% 0.1% 1.04
Cyprus 99.1% 11.9% 9.0% 21.1% 12.7% 99.4% 11.8% 4.0% 17.9% 9.9% -3.2% 0.85
Georgia  -  -  -  -  - 97.8% 0.3% 0.2% 2.6% 0.5%  -  - 
Iraq 84.3% 0.6% 2.2% 7.3% 1.3% 99.3% 1.9% 4.0% 9.1% 2.9% 1.8% 1.24
Israel / Palestine 96.6% 1.5% 3.4% 7.7% 3.6% 98.1% 1.5% 2.5% 6.5% 3.2% -1.2% 0.84
Jordan 93.9% 1.0% 4.1% 6.0% 2.5% 94.8% 0.8% 2.2% 6.4% 2.5% 0.4% 1.06
Table 2 - Emigration rates by educational attaiment and country of birth (1990-2000) (5/6)
Kuwait 88.1% 0.1% 0.2% 3.0% 0.5% 99.4% 0.5% 1.0% 10.0% 2.3% 7.0% 3.37
Lebanon 96.3% 6.4% 21.4% 35.6% 12.6% 98.7% 9.5% 13.1% 29.7% 13.5% -5.9% 0.83
Oman 75.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 97.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 1.43
Qatar 96.1% 0.0% 0.1% 2.1% 0.3% 98.9% 0.1% 0.1% 2.9% 0.5% 0.8% 1.38
Saudi Arabia 92.8% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 0.2% 99.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 0.1% 0.0% 1.01
Syria 90.2% 0.7% 3.2% 6.9% 1.7% 97.0% 0.7% 2.6% 5.2% 1.7% -1.6% 0.76
Turkey 89.4% 4.2% 9.3% 6.3% 4.9% 99.6% 4.6% 7.5% 4.6% 5.0% -1.6% 0.74
United Arab Emirates 84.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 98.5% 0.1% 0.1% 1.2% 0.2% 0.7% 2.35
Yemen 94.2% 0.0% 0.8% 3.3% 0.1% 98.6% 0.1% 1.5% 5.7% 0.2% 2.3% 1.70
South-Central Asia 0.1% 0.4% 4.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 5.1% 0.5% 1.09% 1.27
Afghanistan 92.9% 0.2% 8.8% 11.7% 0.8% 99.6% 0.5% 6.6% 13.2% 1.0% 1.5% 1.13
Bangladesh 84.9% 0.1% 0.2% 2.3% 0.1% 81.9% 0.1% 0.7% 4.7% 0.3% 2.4% 2.02
Bhutan 82.0% 0.0% 0.1% 1.7% 0.0% 96.7% 0.1% 0.3% 1.2% 0.1% -0.4% 0.73
India 96.6% 0.1% 0.2% 2.6% 0.2% 97.3% 0.1% 0.3% 4.2% 0.3% 1.6% 1.61
Iran 85.7% 0.3% 2.2% 23.7% 1.5% 97.2% 0.6% 2.0% 13.1% 1.8% -10.6% 0.55
Kazakhstan  -  -  -  -  - 98.7% 0.5% 0.2% 1.1% 0.5%  -  - 
Kyrgyzstan  -  -  -  -  - 98.5% 0.5% 0.1% 0.7% 0.3%  -  - 
Maldives 90.8% 0.0% 0.1% 2.3% 0.1% 92.9% 0.1% 0.1% 2.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.99
Nepal 93.3% 0.0% 0.1% 1.9% 0.0% 98.7% 0.0% 0.2% 2.7% 0.1% 0.8% 1.43
Pakistan 85.9% 0.2% 0.6% 6.1% 0.4% 93.7% 0.3% 1.1% 9.2% 0.7% 3.1% 1.51
Sri Lanka 85.9% 0.8% 1.5% 24.8% 1.6% 85.8% 1.9% 1.8% 27.5% 2.8% 2.7% 1.11
Tajikistan  -  -  -  -  - 99.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.7% 0.2%  -  - 
Turkmenistan  -  -  -  -  - 97.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%  -  - 
Uzbekistan  -  -  -  -  - 81.5% 0.2% 0.1% 1.0% 0.2%  -  - 
South-Eastern Asia 0.4% 1.9% 10.3% 1.2% 0.5% 2.1% 9.8% 1.7% -0.47% 0.95
Brunei 96.9% 1.0% 2.4% 44.6% 3.5% 100.0% 1.3% 1.3% 21.0% 3.1% -23.6% 0.47
Burma (Myanmar) 99.6% 0.0% 0.3% 3.3% 0.1% 99.8% 0.0% 0.3% 3.4% 0.2% 0.2% 1.05
Cambodia 98.5% 2.2% 7.6% 6.6% 3.0% 98.9% 1.8% 8.6% 6.8% 3.1% 0.2% 1.03
Indonesia 35.3% 0.1% 0.4% 6.2% 0.3% 84.1% 0.1% 0.3% 2.0% 0.2% non reliab. non reliab.
Laos 99.9% 4.5% 18.1% 14.9% 6.7% 99.9% 4.1% 20.9% 13.8% 7.1% -1.0% 0.93
Malaysia 93.4% 0.4% 1.1% 21.5% 1.3% 94.4% 0.6% 0.8% 10.4% 1.5% -11.1% 0.48
Philippines 91.9% 1.1% 3.1% 12.8% 4.1% 87.0% 1.4% 3.1% 14.8% 5.2% 2.0% 1.16
Singapore 96.1% 0.8% 1.6% 20.6% 2.2% 96.6% 1.4% 1.6% 15.2% 3.1% -5.4% 0.74
Thailand 86.5% 0.1% 1.5% 2.4% 0.4% 84.2% 0.3% 1.4% 2.2% 0.7% -0.2% 0.90
Vietnam 94.7% 0.8% 6.3% 21.7% 2.1% 97.1% 1.5% 12.3% 39.0% 4.3% 17.3% 1.79
Eastern Asia 0.1% 0.3% 4.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.3% 4.3% 0.5% 0.21% 1.05
China 79.4% 0.1% 0.1% 3.1% 0.2% 75.6% 0.1% 0.2% 4.2% 0.2% 1.2% 1.38
Hong Kong 99.2% 2.2% 3.2% 29.7% 6.5% 100.0% 4.2% 4.1% 28.7% 8.9% -1.0% 0.97
Macao 99.9% 1.4% 2.4% 20.5% 4.3% 99.9% 9.9% 7.0% 22.6% 10.8% 2.0% 1.10
Japan 95.7% 0.1% 0.3% 1.3% 0.4% 95.9% 0.2% 0.3% 1.5% 0.6% 0.2% 1.20
Korea, North 98.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.6% 1.4% 5.3% 2.2% 5.2% 35.58
Korea, South 40.0% 1.4% 3.7% 20.2% 4.8% 19.2% 2.0% 1.3% 7.9% 2.6% non reliab. non reliab.
Table 2 - Emigration rates by educational attaiment and country of birth (1990-2000) (6/6)
Mongolia 20.3% 0.0% 0.1% 1.1% 0.1% 92.0% 0.1% 0.3% 7.8% 0.4% non reliab. non reliab.
Taiwan 89.5% 0.2% 0.9% 11.4% 2.0% 93.4% 0.3% 1.0% 9.6% 2.5% -1.8% 0.84
OCEANIA
Oceania 3.5% 1.7% 6.1% 3.3% 3.3% 3.4% 6.6% 4.3% 0.60% 1.10
Australia 91.0% 1.7% 0.5% 2.8% 1.4% 94.3% 1.5% 1.4% 2.3% 1.7% -0.5% 0.84
Fiji 99.9% 9.1% 12.6% 63.6% 15.5% 100.0% 10.7% 17.6% 58.7% 19.7% -4.9% 0.92
Kiribati 99.6% 2.3% 3.2% 26.8% 3.9% 100.0% 2.5% 4.3% 24.9% 5.1% -1.9% 0.93
Marshall Islands 99.2% 0.6% 4.5% 27.7% 3.4% 100.0% 0.1% 17.7% 41.0% 11.1% 13.4% 1.48
Micronesia, Federated States of 100.0% 0.3% 2.4% 27.1% 2.5% 100.0% 3.1% 10.8% 36.4% 9.2% 9.3% 1.34
New Zealand 98.7% 10.7% 8.5% 10.2% 10.0% 98.9% 11.3% 9.6% 15.0% 12.4% 4.8% 1.47
Palau 100.0% 2.1% 6.1% 62.6% 9.5% 100.0% 4.2% 19.6% 30.0% 12.3% -32.5% 0.48
Papua New Guinea 99.4% 0.3% 3.8% 35.2% 0.8% 99.9% 0.3% 3.0% 28.2% 1.0% -6.9% 0.80
Samoa 99.8% 37.4% 9.6% 75.9% 35.3% 99.9% 34.4% 47.2% 66.6% 43.1% -9.3% 0.88
Solomon Islands 98.4% 0.2% 0.3% 6.2% 0.5% 99.6% 0.4% 0.4% 3.7% 0.6% -2.6% 0.59
Tonga 99.9% 25.6% 30.6% 77.0% 33.4% 100.0% 29.4% 50.8% 74.2% 44.6% -2.8% 0.96
Vanuatu 99.4% 0.5% 0.8% 9.4% 1.0% 99.6% 1.0% 0.7% 5.0% 1.2% -4.4% 0.53
Note (*): "non reliab." means that at least one observation is based on less than 70 percent of information
3.1 Gross results
Our results indicate that skilled workers are much more concerned by international
migration. At the world level in 1990, high-skill immigrants represented 33 percent
of the OECD immigration stock whilst only 9.1 percent of the world labor force
was tertiary educated. Between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of skilled immigrants
increased to 37 percent. The proportions are more impressive for Africa and Asia
where the skill structure of emigration is much higher than the skill structure of the
domestic labor supply:
² 23.0 percent of African immigrants were tertiary educated in 1990 (31.4 percent
in 2000) whilst the proportion of highly skilled workers in African countries was
2.2 percent (3.6 percent in 2000);
² 43.5 percent of Asian immigrants were tertiary educated in 1990 (47.2 percent
in 2000) whilst the proportion of highly skilled workers in Asian countries was
4.7 percent (6.0 percent in 2000);
² 27.6 percent of Latin American immigrants (including Central America and
the Caribbean) were tertiary educated in 1990 (28.1 percent in 2000) whilst
the proportion of highly skilled workers in Latin American countries was 8.9
percent (11.8 percent in 2000).
The same conclusion holds in terms of emigration rates by educational attainment.
As shown in …gure 1, although there is a close relationship between these two rates,
the emigration rate of skilled workers is higher than the total emigration rate in all
countries. In 2000, the world-wide average emigration rate of skilled workers was
5.47 percent, 3.3 times larger than the average emigration rate of all workers (1.66%)
and 5.8 times larger than the emigration of unskilled workers. By disregarding illegal
migration, we obviously underestimate global and unskilled migration rates.
The emigration of skilled workers is particularly high in some parts of the world.
Figure 2 gives a world map representation of the emigration rate of skilled workers.
the darker the areas, the more a¤ected it is by the brain drain. Clearly, Central
America (including the Caribbean), South Eastern Asian countries and a chain of
countries in Western and Eastern Africa experience a tremendous out‡ow of their
skilled labor force to the OECD.
The brain drain increased between 1990 and 2000. The world-wide average em-
igration rate of skilled workers increased by .75 percentage points over that period,
against .41 for medium skilled workers and .06 for the low skilled. With Mexico (+3.2
points) and Guatemala (+3.9 points), Central America is more and more a¤ected by
the migration of skilled workers. However, it is in Western, Eastern and Central
Africa that the brain drain increased the most severely. Countries experiencing the
largest increases are Angola (+18.4 points), Equatorial Guinea (+29.7 points), Ghana
(+9.2 points), Sao Tome and Principe (+25.9 points), Guinea-Bissau (+23.5 points),
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Liberia (+9.7 points), Mauritania (+19.6 points), Sierra Leone (+10.0 points), Bu-
rundi (+14.9 points), Mauritius (+10.8 points), Mozambique (+23.8 points), Rwanda
(+9.6 points) and Somalia (+19.7 points).
Regarding Asia, the average migration rate of skilled workers decreased inWestern
Asia but increased slightly in South-Central Asia. Remarkable changes are observed
in large countries such as Iran (-10.6 points), Malaysia (-11.1 points), Brunei (-23.6
points) and, in the other direction, Vietnam (+17.3 points).
It is worth noticing that North-North brain drain did decrease over the last 10
years (except in a few countries where the changes were very small). The average
migration rate of tertiary educated workers decreased by 3.15 points in Western Eu-
rope, by 2.19 points in Southern Europe and by 1.88 points in Northern Europe. It
improved signi…cantly in Austria (-7.2 points), Germany (-5.5 points), Greece (-4.9
points), Italy (-2.8 points) and Malta (-16.3 points).
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Figure 1. Skilled migration rate and total emigration rate in 2000
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Figure 2. Skilled emigration in 2000 - World map
3.2 Comparison with previous study
Carrington and Detragiache’s study clearly initiated new debates on the size and the
distribution of the brain drain. Our purpose is to re…ne their method by incorporating
additional statistical sources. By collecting Census, Register and Survey data from
all OECD countries, we eliminate two sources of bias:
² Relying on OECD statistics on immigration brings on several problems. First,
in 1990, these data only provided information on the country of origin for the
top-10 or top-5 sending countries. Hence, small sending countries are usually not
identi…ed, at least in the majority of receiving countries. Second, immigration
in EU countries is based on the concept of citizenship rather than on country of
birth. Third, immigration data are missing for a few OECD countries (Greece,
Iceland, Mexico, Slovakia, Turkey). Finally, the OECD provides data on the
total immigration stock rather than on the adult immigration stock (which
can be compared with the labor force in sending countries). Compared to
national Censuses, we estimate that relying on OECD statistics implies an
average underestimation in skilled workers migration rates by 11.3% in 1990
and 10.6% in 2000. This is the major source of bias, especially for small sized
countries which are usually not identi…ed as important sending countries;
² Transposing the US educational structure on other OECD countries induces an
average overestimation in skilled workers migration rates by 7.25% in 1990 and
6.22% in 2000. The bias is obviously strong in countries sending a minor part
of their emigrants to the US.
On average, Carrington and Detragiache’s method underestimates the emigration
rates of skilled workers by 4% in 1990 and 4.4% in 2000. This appears in …gure
3 (…g 3.A and 3.B) which gives skilled migration rates evaluated under three mea-
surement methods: (i) a method fully based on Censuses and administrative data
(our method), (ii) a method based on OECD statistics and US educational attain-
ment data (Carrington and Detragriache), (iii) an intermediate method based on
Census/administrative data and US educational attainment data. In comparison to
the Census method, the second method clearly underestimates the brain drain for
a large majority of countries. On the contrary, the third method overestimates the
brain drain.
The two sources of bias cancel each other in a couple of cases. However, the
brain drain is particularly overestimated in countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Mo-
rocco, Turkey, Somalia. By transposing the educational structure observed in the US,
Carrington and Detragiache and Adams obtain high emigration rates of tertiary ed-
ucation workers for these countries (between 55 and 65 percent for North Africa and
Turkey). Taking into account the low level of education observed among emigrants
to Europe (where the large majority of these migrants live), we obtain much lower
skilled emigration rates (between 5 and 10 percent).
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       Figure 3. Comparison with alternative methods
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A. Emigration rates under 3 measurement methods (1990)
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B. Emigration rates under 3 measurement methods (2000)
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C. Number of reliable obs. and reliability rate* - US sharing vs Census sharing
(*) % of emigrants for which educational attainment is observed
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On the contrary, the brain drain is strongly underestimated in countries such
as the Gambia, Madagascar, Gabon, Brunei, Papua New Guinea. These countries
send a relatively small number of emigrants to non-US areas. They are usually not
identi…ed in the OECD migration statistics. Consequently, their emigration rates are
largely underestimated.
The last …gure (…g 3.C) represents the percentage of emigrants on the basis of
which educational attainment is extrapolated (let us call this proportion a ”reliabil-
ity rate”). On average, our method is based on 92.7 percent of observations. A method
relying on US educational attainment is based on 44.1 percent of observations. How-
ever, the reliability rate is heterogenous bewteen countries. Figure 3.C represents the
number of reliable country estimates as a function of the reliability criterion required
by any user of the database. The function is obviously decreasing: the number of
reliable observations decreases with the degree of reliability imposed by the user. For
example, setting the reliability rate at 80 percent, our database provides 175 reliable
country observations in 2000 (160 reliable observations in 2000). Transposing the
US immigration structure to the total stock of immigrants, we would only provide
23 reliable observations in 2000 (22 countries in 1990) at the same reliability rate.
By extending the number of observations and their degree of reliability, our method
provides useful material to examine the changes in the international distribution of
migration rates, to test for the (push and pull) determinants of migration per skill
group or to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of migration on source and
destination countries.
4 Key indicators
Let us summarize the results by a few …gures.
Immigration structure in OECD areas. The intensity of the brain drain
clearly depends on the structure of immigration in OECD countries. Figure 4 de-
scribes that structure. In …gure 4.A, it clearly appears that the US is the major
destination country for skilled workers. The proportion of OECD educated migrants
residing in the US increased from 48 percent to 53 percent between 1990 and 2000.
The European Union is the second destination, attracting 16.3 percent of the edu-
cated in 2000 and 15.2 in 1990 (the migration between European countries is counted),
just above Canada (13.9 percent in 2000 and 15.7 in 1990). Figure 4.B shows that
the proportion of skilled immigrants in the total immigration stock is very high in
Canada (58 percent). It is lower in Australia (46 percent) and the US (44%), and
quite low in the European Union (22 percent). Such disparities are due to the histori-
cal composition of immigration ‡ows over the last decades. Focusing on the variation
between 1990 and 2000 (capturing recent immigration policies), it appears that the
rise in educational attainment of immigrants has been very strong in Australia and,
to a lesser extent, in Canada, compared to the US and Europe. These trends are
compatible with the stylized facts and policy measures presented in the introduction.
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Antecol et al (2003) also con…rm our results by comparing the composition the stock
of immigrants who arrived after 1985 in the US, Canada and Australia. Finally, …gure
4.C shows that the low-income countries have been strongly a¤ected by the recent
brain drain. In all OECD areas, the percentage of skilled immigrants coming from
low-income countries (such as India, China, Vietnam, Pakistan, Indonesia) increased
between 1990 and 2000. This is especially the case in North America.
Who is su¤ering from the brain drain? Table 3 gives the 30 most a¤ected
countries in 2000. Of course, the intensity of brain drain di¤ers if it is measured
in absolute or relative terms. In absolute terms (number of educated emigrants),
the largest countries are obviously strongly a¤ected by the brain drain. The stock
of skilled emigrants is high in the Philippines, India, China, Mexico and Vietnam
but also in developed countries such as the UK and Germany, Canada or Italy. In
relative terms (as a proportion of the educated labor force), small countries with a
population below 4 million are the most a¤ected. The emigration rate exceeds 80
percent in nations such as Suriname, Guyana, Haiti and Jamaica. One could argue
that the distance from the US is a key element explaining the high emigration rates
from these countries. Nevertheless, we believe that reality is much more complex.
First, a simple regression of emigration rates on distances (in logs) to the closest
OECD country reveals that distance cannot explain country di¤erences (the slope is
not signicantly di¤erent from zero for the subset of small countries with population
below 4 million12). Second, although being close to the US, countries such as Suriname
send most of their migrants to other countries (the Netherlands): historical, cultural,
linguistic and colonial ties are potentially important. Formal tests would be required
to assess the role of push and pull factors in the international mobility of skilled
workers.
Excluding small sized countries (population below 4 million), column 3 stresses
the importance of the brain drain in Africa and Central America. On the Western
and Eastern coasts of Africa, tremendous rates of emigration are found in nations
such as Somalia, Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Nigeria or Madagascar. In Asia,
Vietnam and Lebanon are the most a¤ected. Regarding Europe, emigration rates
are particularly strong in two countries of ex-Yugoslavia (Croatia and Serbia) and
in the United Kingdom. The last column in table 3 reveals that countries from the
ex-USSR, South America and the Arab Gulf exhibit very small rates (as well as in
Japan, France and the United States). Finally, it is worth noticing that developing
countries with large stocks of skilled emigrants may exhibit low rates of emigration.
This is obviously the case of India, China and Brazil.
12Note that with the full sample, the relationship becomes signi…cant. The skilled emigration rate
can be explained by a log-linear equation EMRi = 1:7133 ¡ 0:1676 £ Log(MinDisti) with an R2
of 16.21.
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       Figure 4. Skilled immigration in OECD areas
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The world distribution of the brain drain. It is interesting to compute
average migration rates by region, income group (the World Bank classi…cation dis-
tinguishes four categories) and size groups (above 25 million, between 10 and 25
million, between 4 and 10 million and below 4 million). It comes out that the dis-
tribution of emigration rates is strongly heterogenous within groups. For example,
the disparities between the Caribbean countries and the US are tremendously high in
America; large di¤erences are observed between high-income countries such as Malta,
Ireland, Hong-Kong and, on the other hand, Australia, Japan or the USA. However,
as shown in …gure 5, disparities in the average rates reveal interesting results.
Regarding the regional distribution (see …gure 5.A), the most a¤ected continents
are Africa and Europe. Oceania and Asia exhibit intermediate rates whilst the average
American brain drain is small. The regional disparities are extremely stable between
1990 and 2000. As for income groups (see …gure 5.B), it is worth noticing that the
highest rates are observed in middle income countries. High income countries (less
incentives to emigrate) and low-income countries (where liquidity constraint are likely
to be more binding) exhibit the lowest rates. As reported in Schi¤ (1996), liquidity
constraints in poor and unequal societies explain the increasing relationship between
income and migration at low income levels. Papers by Freeman (1993), Faini and
Venturini (1993), Funkhouser (1995), World Bank (1994) have shown that emigrants
essentially do not come from low income group. It is worth noticing that between
1990 and 2000, the situation clearly improved in lower-middle income countries and
deteriorated in low-income countries.
Finally, regarding size groups, we obtain a decreasing relationship between emi-
gration rates and country population sizes. Disparities are also extremely stable over
time. Our key indicators suggest that country size, GDP per capita, inequality and
poverty rates are important determinants of emigration. Obviously, formal tests
would be required to assess the relative e¤ect of selection, network e¤ects, economic,
cultural, historical or political determinants of emigration. Whether these factors
play di¤erently across skill groups is a crucial issue.
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Table 3. Emigration (stocks or rates) of skilled workers in selected countries
Emigration stock in 2000 Emigration rate in 2000 Idem with Pop. > 4 millions Emigration rate in 2000 Idem with Pop. > 4 millions
30 largest stocks 30 highest rates 30 highest rates 30 lowest rates 30 lowest rates
1 United Kingdom 1 542 011 Suriname 89.9% Haiti 81.6% Venezuela 3.3% Sweden 4.4%
2 Philippines 1 260 879 Guyana 85.9% Somalia 58.6% Brazil 3.3% Egypt 4.2%
3 India 1 021 613 Jamaica 82.5% Ghana 42.9% Burkina Faso 3.3% China 4.2%
4 Germany 1 016 007 Haiti 81.6% Mozambique 42.0% Belarus 3.0% India 4.2%
5 China  906 337 Trinidad and Tobago 78.4% Sierra Leone 41.0% Qatar 2.9% Moldova 4.2%
6 Mexico  901 347 Tonga 74.2% Vietnam 39.0% Nepal 2.7% France 3.9%
7 Canada  566 833 Saint Kitts and Nevis 71.8% Nigeria 36.1% Georgia 2.6% Libya 3.8%
8 Italy  470 331 Antigua and Barbuda 70.9% Madagascar 36.0% Azerbaijan 2.6% Burma (Myanmar) 3.4%
9 Vietnam  446 895 Cape Verde 69.1% El Salvador 31.5% Spain 2.6% Venezuela 3.3%
10 United States  428 078 Grenada 66.7% Nicaragua 30.9% Argentina 2.5% Brazil 3.3%
11 Korea, North  422 518 Samoa 66.6% Lebanon 29.7% Lesotho 2.4% Burkina Faso 3.3%
12 Korea, South  384 497 Gambia, The 64.7% Croatia 29.4% Australia 2.3% Belarus 3.0%
13 Poland  379 266 Barbados 61.4% Cuba 28.9% Paraguay 2.3% Nepal 2.7%
14 Cuba  336 419 Dominica 58.9% Hong Kong 28.7% Andorra 2.3% Georgia 2.6%
15 Japan  331 892 Fiji 58.7% Papua New Guinea 28.2% Maldives 2.2% Azerbaijan 2.6%
16 France  301 717 Seychelles 58.6% Sri Lanka 27.5% Thailand 2.2% Spain 2.6%
17 Iran  282 587 Somalia 58.6% Kenya 26.3% Botswana 2.1% Argentina 2.5%
18 Taiwan  280 710 Saint Vincent & Gren. 56.8% Angola 25.6% Indonesia 2.0% Australia 2.3%
19 Russian Federation  263 041 Malta 55.2% Senegal 24.1% Japan 1.5% Paraguay 2.3%
20 Jamaica  260 850 Belize 51.0% Honduras 21.8% Russian Federation 1.3% Thailand 2.2%
21 Hong Kong  254 805 Mauritius 48.0% Dominican Republic 21.7% Bhutan 1.2% Indonesia 2.0%
22 Brazil  254 467 Eritrea 45.8% Uganda 21.6% United Arab Emirates 1.2% Japan 1.5%
23 Netherlands  240 494 Ghana 42.9% Guatemala 21.5% Kazakhstan 1.1% Russian Federation 1.3%
24 Ukraine  237 395 Mozambique 42.0% Burundi 19.9% Uzbekistan 1.0% Kazakhstan 1.1%
25 Colombia  232 596 Marshall Islands 41.0% Rwanda 19.0% Kyrgyzstan 0.7% Uzbekistan 1.0%
26 Ireland  220 545 Sierra Leone 41.0% Serbia and Monten. 17.4% Saudi Arabia 0.7% Kyrgyzstan 0.7%
27 Romania  217 198 Vietnam 39.0% Ethiopia 17.0% Tajikistan 0.7% Saudi Arabia 0.7%
28 Peru  183 915 Liberia 37.4% United Kingdom 16.7% United States 0.5% Tajikistan 0.7%
29 Pakistan  174 884 Bahamas, The 36.4% Tanzania 15.8% Oman 0.5% United States 0.5%
30 New Zealand  172 582 Micronesia 36.4% Slovakia 15.3% Turkmenistan 0.1% Turkmenistan 0.1%
   Figure 5. Skilled emigration rates by country group
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5 Conclusion
Due to the poor quality of international data, assessing the economic impact of the
brain drain is a challenging issue. Building on the seminal work of Carrington and
Detragiache (1998), this paper provides a new dataset on skilled emigration rates
describing the loss of skilled workers in both developing and developed countries. By
increasing the number of observations and improving their degree of reliability, our
method provides useful material for econometric analysis of the causes and conse-
quences of the brain drain.
In absolute terms, we show that the largest stocks of educated emigrants are
from Europe, Southern and Eastern Asia and, to a lesser extent, Central America.
Nevertheless, as a proportion of the local educated labor force, the highest rates
are observed in Central America and Africa (on the Western and Eastern coasts).
Between 1990 and 2000, these regions also experienced the strongest increase in brain
drain.
Our dataset is obviously evolutionary. It can be improved in several ways:
² This release uses survey data when census data are not available yet. By incor-
porating new OECD censuses, we will improve the quality of our estimates;
² Adding immigration data from non-OECD countries (Gulf states, South Africa,
Eastern Asia) would also strongly improve the quality of our estimates for the
major countries involved (Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Zimbabwe,
Namibia.);
² Repeating the exercise for 1980 would also ease the econometric exploitation of
the database.
Despite these possible developments, we believe that the current version of our
database delivers information that is rich enough to assess the changes in the inter-
national distribution of migration rates, to test for the (push and pull) determinants
per skill group or to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of migration on source
and destination countries.
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